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Revenue Service (IRS) did not exercise reasonable diligence in mailing the
notice to the taxpayers' last known address. The taxpayers moved from their
old address in late 1987. On February 29, 1988, the IRS sent the notice of
deficiency to the taxpayers' old address by certified mail. The Post Office
erroneously ignored the taxpayers' timely filed change of address forms and
returned the undelivered notice to the IRS. On December 26, 1988, the IRS
mailed a final notice of intention to levy to the taxpayers' new address. On
January 11, 1989, the taxpayers filed a petition with the Tax Court in order
to avoid payment of the deficiency prior to a determination on the merits.
The Tax Court dismissed the petition because the taxpayers filed it more
than ninety days after the mailing of the notice of deficiency.
The Fourth Circuit stated that the IRS's mailing of a notice of deficiency
is sufficient if the IRS mails the notice to the taxpayer's last known address.
The "last known address" is what, after the exercise of reasonable diligence,
the IRS may consider to be the address of the taxpayer on the date the IRS
mails the notice. 958 F.2d at 55. The Post Office's error of nondelivery made
the notice insufficient and the IRS's receipt of the undelivered notice showed
a lack of reasonable diligence in finding the last known address. Id. at 56.
Thus, the taxpayers' timely filed their petition and the Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the Tax Court where the Powells could contest the
asserted deficiency prior to the payment thereof.
The case indirectly provides a lesson for all taxpayers: Use registered or
certified return receipt mail in filing estimated payments, tax returns and all
other documents with the IRS. The registration or return receipt will provide
prima facie evidence of the fact that the taxpayer filed the item and of the
date of filing. I.R.C. § 7502(c) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 301.7502-1(d)(1) (as
amended in 1960). If the IRS had lost the Powell's return in the above case,
the Powells would have had a much more difficult time in court unless they
retained the registration or return receipt with respect to that return.
XI.

SEcurrms REGULATION

Reviewed by PROFESSO. LYMAN P.Q. JOHNSON
A.

Reliance on Oral Representations

In Myers v. Finkle, 950 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1991), the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a determination of whether a
purchaser of securities may be justified in relying on oral representations that
conflict with contemporaneous written statements contained in a private
placement memorandum delivered to the investor requires a consideration of
eight relevant factors. These relevant factors include: (1) the sophistication
and expertise of the plaintiff in financial and securities matters; (2) the
existence of long standing business or personal relationships; (3) access to
relevant information; (4) the existence of a fiduciary relationship; (5) concealment of the fraud; (6) the opportunity to detect fraud; (7) whether the
plaintiff initiated the stock transaction or sought to expedite the transaction;
and (8) the generality or specificity of the misrepresentations. Because no
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single factor is dispositive, consideration of all eight factors is necessary.
The court, presented with an unusual factual situation in which oral
representations were contradicted by express warnings in private placement
memoranda, stated that knowledge of information should be imputed to
investors who fail to exercise caution when they have in their possession
documents apprising them of the risks associated with the investments. In
short, investors are charged with constructive knowledge of the risks and
warnings contained in private placement memoranda. Therefore, in evaluating
the eight factors relevant to justifiable reliance, the conduct of investors must
be examined as if they had knowledge of all attendant warnings.
In Myers, the Fourth Circuit also discussed its interpretation of the
"sophistication" requirement. 950 F.2d at 167. The court stated that while
wealth alone may be an important factor in determining the sophistication
of an investor, it is not the dispositive factor. The court stated that other
criteria, such as age, education, professional status, investment experience,
and business background, may also be relevant in such determinations.
B. Fraud-Duty to Disclose
In Forston v. Winstead, McGuire, Sechrest & Minick, 961 F.2d 469 (4th
Cir. 1992), investors in a real estate limited partnership brought a securities
fraud suit against the syndicator of the securities offering, the general partners,
and the law firm retained by the general partners to prepare the tax opinions
for the offering memorandum. The Fourth Circuit held that under section
10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. section 78j(b), the
failure to disclose material information constitutes securities fraud only upon
proof of a duty to disclose. Looking to cases previously decided in the Fourth,
Fifth, and Seventh Circuits, the court stated that federal securities laws are
not themselves, with respect to the section 10b claim, the source of a duty
to disclose material facts. Thus, with respect to a section 10b claim, the duty
to disclose material facts arises only where there is some basis outside the
federal securities laws, such as, for example, a state law, for finding a
fiduciary or other confidential relationship.
The court found that such a duty to disclose material facts plainly ran
from the syndicator of the offering and the general partners. However, the
court questioned whether such a duty ran from the law firm. Appellants
argued that the law firm's duty to disclose arose under Texas common law,
a Treasury Department regulation, and an American Bar Association ethics
opinion. The court did not find merit in appellant's contentions. Appellants
further asked the court, in the absence of a duty grounded in law, to create
a duty of disclosure grounded in public policy-the policy of having law
firms monitor, on pain of liability, the representations that their clients make
to any third party. The court declined to accept this argument, stating that
the result of appellant's position would be a rigid rule charging all attorneys
who involve themselves in any facet of a commercial transaction with responsibility for the entire transaction. The court found that an "omnipresent"
duty of disclosure would not only be unfair to law firms, but would also
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destroy incentives for clients to be forthcoming with their attorneys and would
artificially inflate the cost of involving legal counsel in commercial transactions. 961 F.2d at 475.

